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ABSTRACT
The challenge of stable electricity supply in Nigeria with its harrowing effects on socio-economic
development accounted largely for government decision for privatization of the power sector.
However, the extent to which this purpose has been achieved requires investigation, which
necessitates this study. Survey research design was adopted, with questionnaire administered
on both residential and commercial customers of Ibadan and Ikeja electricity Distribution com-
panies selected as focus for the study. Multiple regression statistics was used for data analysis. The
result shows that both distribution companies (DISCOs) have brought no significant improvement
to electricity supply going by the quality, billing, coverage, metering, load shedding, and response
to customers’ indicators. Thus we recommend that DISCOs should source for fund from the capital
market in order engender customer satisfaction, inject fund for replacement or upgrade of
dilapidated power equipments, provision of meters, especially, prepaid type while government
make the business environment convenient for healthy competition and regulation.
KEYWORDS
Privatization; power sector;
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Introduction
Background to the study
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) (2009, p. 59) asserts that “The Nigerian
electricity power system, which has been run since
1972 by vertically integrated state-owned monopoly
National Electric Power Authority (NEPA), is chroni-
cally dilapidated with respect to infrastructure, com-
mercial standards and customer service” This aptly
captures the dire state of the country’s power sector,
thus necessitating government reform programs in
which privatization is Kernel amongst other measures.
Omoleke (2011) specifically documents NEPA chal-
lenges, before it was structurally transformed into
Power Holding Company (PHCN) for privatization,
as that of insufficient power generation, poor access
to infrastructure, low connection rate, inefficient capa-
city utilization, and inadequate transmission and dis-
tribution facilities among others. The depressive impact
of poor electricity supply on social wellbeing and eco-
nomic growth underscores the criticism of NEPA’s on
its abysmal performance and increasing demands from
customers and stakeholders, including international
organizations, such as, World Bank, International
Monetary Fund, for its privatization. Additionally at
the domestic level, most of the commissions instituted
on the review of public utilities service delivery by the
government strongly recommended privatization or
commercialization of public enterprises, especially the
Onosode commission (Ibietan, 2013). As a result, and,
in response to NEPA’s performance, privatization of
the sector was considered by government as an option.
Firstly, the Technical Committee on Privatisation
and Commercialization (TCPC) established by the gov-
ernment in pursuit of the privatization policy partially
commercialized NEPA (Zayyad, 1992). It was the first
window used to introduce NEPA to business orienta-
tion management, which according to Abdul (1992),
brought improvement on the facilities, staff welfare
and revenue collection. But, it appears this fell short
of customers’ expectations making it to undergo
a review of its management, especially ownership and
control. Thus, in 1999, NEPA was not only slated for
privatization (Adelaja, 2007), but also Power Sector
Reform Bill (PSRB) was signed into law intends to
enable private sector involvement in power generation,
transmission and distribution. Furthermore, the Bill
empowered Power Holding Company of Nigeria
(PHCN) as successor to NEPA and unbundled it into
18 companies comprising of six generation companies
(GENCOs), one transmission company (TCN) and 11
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distribution companies (DISCOs) with National
Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC) as regula-
tory institution (Onagoruwa, 2011).
In 2013, DISCOs and GENCOs were privatized while
TCN was place under management contract agreement
(Enoche, Egware, & Eyakanor, 2015). By these structural
changes, PHCN existence ended, NERC fully assumed
regulatory roles, and the sector became operational
under a liberalized environment and private sector dri-
ven at the same time. Expectedly, the public sector
bureaucratic bottleneck, managerial interference, and
other constraints hampering power sector efficient per-
formance started receiving attention. However, empiri-
cal research to ascertain the Nigeria power sector
postprivatization performance assessment is lacking in
the literature but scanty textual analysis. Thus, this work,
using Ibadan and Ikeja DISCOs as focus, examines
whether Nigeria’s power sector privatization has
brought about improved performance of DISCOs in
the postprivatization era. The work is divided into
seven sections. Following this introduction is the theo-
retical framework while empirical framework comes
after. Method of study takes the fourth section while
data presentation and analysis follows as the fifth.
Afterward, discussion of findings and conclusion and
recommendations account for the sixth and seventh
sections respectively.
Theoretical framework
This work utilizes the theory of privatization as appro-
priate framework for its analysis. Privatization as
a concept “has been prominent in international eco-
nomic and political circles since 1970s” (Omoleke and
Adeopo, 2005, p 69). Its origin is traced to United
Kingdom (UK) as forerunner in 1970s but became
a consuming economic passion under Margret
Thatcher’s last two terms (Clarke & Chisto, 1993). Put
differently, privatization gained prominence as a theory
out of UK’s adoption and application for economic
reformation. Nevertheless, it derives its thrust from
neoliberal political-economic orientation. As noted by
Muogbo (2013), it is anchored on the benefits of mar-
ket economy system, especially efficient service, effec-
tiveness and productivity alongside deregulation or
liberalization of operating environment. However, to
what extent can free market economy bring about
efficient private delivery of reckonable performance in
every economy without government intervention in the
system is a pertinent question that privatization advo-
cates have not provided satisfactory answers to, espe-
cially, the extent and limit of public sector involvement.
Nevertheless, Urgorji (1995) asserts that privatiza-
tion is an acceptable policy states’ political economy.
This suggests that it has accounted for its global
embrace in economic reforms beginning from mid-
1980s in some developing economies like Nigeria.
Hence, its application to the power sector reforms
program by Nigeria government. The anticipated deli-
verables, more importantly, improved performance of
public utilities, to a large extent, informed govern-
ment’s efforts in adopting privatization of the sector
with high optimism that NEPA’s inefficiency, unprofi-
table management system, and other shortcomings
would become historical narratives. The implication is
that new experience, according to Gujral (2013) of
reliable power supply, tariffs, efficiency of service,
response to customers’ needs, used in measuring elec-
tricity sector performance, and others, such as metering
and extensive coverage areas, would be entrenched. As
such, populace expectation of better electricity experi-
ence is heighten with believe of its corresponding head-
long effect on national socio-economic life.
But, Aluko’s (n.d. cited in Muogbo, 2013) averment
that private sector inherent efficiency from Nigeria’s
experience is questionable, because their profit ema-
nated from inflated contracts, patronage and corruption
rather than efficient operation and productivity. In this
sense, the efficiency performance thesis of privatization
seems doubtful in the Nigeria’s context, considering her
unpredictable political environment that appears to
entangle liberal business operations. Can one isolate
private operators in the country’s power sector from
this unwholesome indulgence? It seems impossible
because of the shared business environment. Therefore,
postprivatization performance of IBEDC and IKEDC in
such situations cannot be assumed with certainty and,
this, requires investigation.
Empirical review of cross-national
postprivatization performance
This section reviews empirical findings of researches on
postprivatization performance of both developed and
emerging economies with a view to providing insight
for this study.
In the study assessing postprivatization of power sec-
tor in India by Zafar (2015) titled “Best Practices India
Power Sector Restructuring Study: Short Review of
Privatisation in Power Sector,” the findings of Orissa
state Electricity Board Privatisation in 1996, which was
the ninth largest state in India, revealed that electrified
territory increased by 13 percent, brought cash flow for
government and also increased Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) by 12%on annual basis (Zafar, 2017: 9). It implies
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that government revenue was boosted and more citizens
are connected to electricity power as dividends of post-
privatization within the state showed positive impact on
GDP. Nevertheless, pricing and quality of services
among other indices were not included in the research.
The work of Soukaina and Amal (2015) on United
Kingdom (UK) titled “The British Privatisation of
Electricity Network Industry: The effect of the
Electricity Reform on Domestic Electricity Price in the
United Kingdom,” shows that the price of electricity
was not influenced by privatization significantly and
responded to coal and natural gas prices that are exo-
genous factors as well. While these findings were
arrived at from the correlation analysis of domestic
retail price of electricity and fuel price, it does not
consider the country’s preprivatization pricing that
seems relatively stable when compared with developing
countries like Nigeria characterized by tariff subsidy
from government and poor regulatory environment.
In the assessment of Cameroon electricity sector
reform by Pincus (2014) titled “Transparency in the
Dark-An assessment of the Cameroon Electricity Sector
Reform”, findings show that private sector investment
growing the economy was partly achieved while the goal
of improving quality of services was not achieved but
worsened. Also, increase in access to electricity was
attained but competitive pricing was not achieved.
Cameroon postprivatization performance, going by pri-
cing, was a failure but more customers are connected to
electricity power. Hence its impact on the socio-economy
could not have been fully attained since the price does not
promote low tariff or production cost.
Nepal and Foster (2016) study of Australia postpri-
vatization power sector privatization experience titled
“Electricity Networks Privatisation in Australia: An
Overview of the Debate” findings of the comparative
study of privately owned and state-owned companies
disclosed that private companies tariff is not worse off;
they reduced network costs and improved quality of
electricity supply and investment without price increase
when compared to state-owned companies. In sum, the
findings position privately owned firms better in terms
of performance than public enterprises judging by fair
pricing and quality of electricity supply.
The study of Hashim (2017) on Iraq titled “An
assessment of Electricity sector Reform in Iraq” corro-
borated that of Australia positive gains as it revealed
that privatization of the sector brought about
a reduction in electricity consumption, curbed energy
waste and as well reduced collection fees. Iraq’s experi-
ence showcases consumers’ prudent usage of power as
part of postprivatization benefits, aside lesser consump-
tion cost to the DISCOs.
From the empirical review, while findings show
somewhat positive benefits in most countries, it appears
there exist no single study that comprehensively carried
out a postprivatization study using the key variables of
quality of electricity supply, pricing or billing, coverage,
metering, Load shedding and Responsiveness to custo-
mers’ needs by DISCOs.
Method of study
This research adopts survey research method and elicits
data through Likert 4-type questionnaire from residen-
tial and commercial customers of IBEDC and IKEDC.
Population of the study
Residential and commercial customers of IBEDC and
IKEDC constitute the population of this study. The
industrial customers are excluded because a sizable
number of them depend less on national grid for
power supply. IBEDC has 1,595.000 (IBEDC prospec-
tus, 2017) while IKEDC (IKEDC prospectus, 2017) has
690,000 total number of both residential and commer-
cial customers respectively totaling 2,285,000.
Sample and sampling method
The Krejcie and Morgan (1970) sample size formula
was used to determine the sample for this study. This is
shown in Table 1. The sample size recommended by
Table 1 for IBEDC and IKEDC is 382 and 384 respec-
tively and both totaled 771. However, because of the
large number of IBEDC customers, its sample size was
increased to 499 that is by 30% as suggested by Israel
(2013). Thus, the total sample size for the study is 881
Table 1. Table for determining sample size of known population.
N S N S N S N S N S
10 10 100 80 280 162 800 260 2,800 338
15 14 110 86 290 165 850 265 3,000 341
20 19 120 92 300 169 900 269 3,500 346
25 24 130 97 320 175 950 274 4,000 351
30 28 140 103 340 181 1,000 278 4,500 354
35 32 150 108 360 186 1,100 285 5,000 357
40 36 160 113 380 191 1,200 291 6,000 361
45 40 170 118 400 196 1,300 297 7,000 364
50 44 180 123 420 201 1,400 302 8,000 367
55 48 190 127 440 205 1,500 306 9,000 368
60 52 200 132 460 210 1,600 310 10,000 370
65 56 210 136 480 214 1,700 313 15,000 375
70 59 220 140 500 217 1,800 317 20,000 377
75 63 230 144 550 226 1,900 320 30,000 379
80 66 240 148 600 234 2,000 322 40,000 380
85 70 250 152 650 242 2,200 327 50,000 381
90 73 260 155 700 248 2,400 331 75,000 382
95 76 270 159 750 254 2,600 335 1,000,000 384
Note: N is Population Size; S is Sample Size
Source: Krejcie & Morgan 1970
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enhancing good representativeness of the population.
Also, multi-stage sampling technique was used for this
study. At first stage, stratified sampling was adopted to
classify the study population into five regions-Ibadan,
Oyo, Kwara, Ogun an Osun for IBEDC and business
hubs into Abule-Egba, Akowonjo, Ikeja, Ikorodu,
Oshodi and Somolu-for IKEDC. Thereafter, Simple
random sampling was used at second stage in selecting
residential and commercial customers within both
companies franchise areas. Questionnaire was adminis-
tered on the selected areas.
Validity and reliability of instrument
Firstly, logical validity was in ascertaining research instru-
ment. To this effect, experts were drawn from the senior
facultymembers of theDepartment of Political Science and
International Relations to Covenant University Ota to vali-
date the questionnaire. Cronbach Alpha test, which
exceeded 0.7, that is, 0.813 as shown in Table 2, was used
to confirm the reliability of the instrument
Method of data analysis
Both descriptive and multiple regression inferential statis-
tical analysis were used as analytical tools for this study. The
demographic and respondents data to questionnaire were
presented in tables and descriptively analyzed while regres-
sionwas used to predict the strength of relationship and test
the research hypothesis. Noteworthy, IBM SPSS Modellers
version 23 was employed for the statistical analysis.
Data presentation and discussion
This section presents biographical and responses of
respondents data to questions posed. Afterward, the
data was analyzed which provide premises for the
research conclusion and recommendations.
Descriptive statistics on the critical parameters for
postprivatization performance of IBEDC and IKEDC
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of responses to post-
privatization indicators of electricity supply, pricing,
coverage, metering, load shedding, and responsiveness
to customers’ needs. These are critical success factors
that largely determine the extent of DISCOs performance.
While customers either agree or disagree with the ques-
tions, it is instructive that most of the items are disagreed
with are to varying degrees by most respondents with an
overall mean of 1.92 (SD = 0.55). Similarly, from the
performance column, it can be inferred that respondents
disagreed that they are satisfied with the service of the
distribution Companies in their communities. Implicitly,
DISCOs performance, judging by the indices, fell short of
customers’ satisfaction with supply, coverage and load
shedding indicating higher abysmally poor performance
level. Hence, postprivatization performance fell short of
being described as successful making inefficiency preva-
lent in the sector that suggest that DISCOs lacked
required technical, managerial and financial capacity to
drive electricity distributions within their franchise areas.
Hypothesis testing
Research hypothesis
The research hypothesis is stated below:
Ho critical parameters have no significant impact on
the postprivatization performance of IBEDC and
IKEDC in Nigeria
H1 critical parameters have significant impact on the
postprivatization performance of IBEDC and IKEDC.
Interpretation of result. Table 4 shows the extent to
which the variance in the dependent variable of perfor-
mance outcome is explained by the independent vari-
able (critical parameters or indices measure). The
adjusted R-squared that identified the percentage of
variance in the dependent variable, explained by the
independent variable shows 202 (that is 20.2%) varia-
bility of the independent variable that is, indices mea-
sures of response to customers load shedding,
electricity supply, pricing, metering and coverage. The
standard error of the estimate indicates 391012 that
signified error term. The Durbin Watson result at
1.719 is within recommended range of 1.5–2.5 validat-
ing the result.
Table 5 appraises the statistical significance of the six
measures of privatization measures of power sector.
ANOVA tests the null hypothesis that multiple R in
the population equals O. Decision Rule: Reject the Null
hypothesis, when the significance value is below 0.05.
Do not reject hypothesis, when significance value is
greater than 0.05.
Table 2. Internal consistency reliability result.
Variables Cronbach’s alpha Items
Electricity supply 0.711 2
Pricing/Billing 0.852 2
Coverage 0.951 2
Metering 0.801 2
Load shedding 0.791 2
Response to customers 0.773 2
Average 0.813 6
Source: SPSS Output Result.
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Interpretation of result. Table 6 shows that F value is
31.797 at .000b significant level. This implies that critical
parameters indicative of postprivatization success factors of
the power sector have no significant effect on performance
outcome ofDISCOswith zero or negligible significant level.
Interpretation of result. The coefficient Table 6 shows
the simple model that expresses the extent to which
critical parameters of the power sector has an effect on
performance outcome and which of the variables
included in the model contributed to the prediction of
the dependent variable. The tests of Tolerance showing
individual values above 0.20 (Menard, 1995) and VIF
with individual value below 10 (Myers, 1990) prove that
there is no concern of multicollinearity problem. The
study is interested in comparing the contribution of
each independent variable; therefore, beta values are
used for the comparison.
The model indicated that electricity supply had the
most statistical significance in predicting performance,
recording the highest beta value of (beta = .256, with
a Tval higher than 1.96, Sig. .000 p < .05), followed by
customers’ responsivenesswith a beta value of (beta= .224,
Tval higher than 1.96, Sig. .009 p < .05). Pricing/billing
does made inverse significant contribution in explaining
performance outcome, as it shows a negative beta value
(beta = −.129, Tval lower than 1.96, p > .05). The regres-
sion equation from table 4.10 is:
Performance outcome Predicted ¼ 2:425þ:129
electricitysupply:129  pricing=billing
þ:121  coverageþ:177 metering
þ:186  loadsheddingþ:224
customers0responsiveness
By interpretation, it means that for every unit increase
in electricity supply, a .129 unit increase in perfor-
mance outcome is predicted, holding all other variables
constant. On the other hand, for every unit increase in
coverage, metering, load shedding and customers’
responsiveness, there is12.1%, 17.7%, 18.6%, and
22.4% increase in performance outcome; while for
every unit increase in the pricing/billing, we expect an
approximately 12.9% decrease in performance out-
comes. This means that electricity supply and custo-
mers’ responsiveness makes the strongest unique
contribution to explaining performance outcome.
Decision. The significance level below 0.05 implies
a statistical confidence of above 95%. This means that
the critical parameters of the power sector have an
effect on performance outcome. Thus, the null hypoth-
esis (H0) that states that “critical parameters have no
significant impact on the postprivatization performance
of the IBEDC and IKEDC in Nigeria” was accepted;
while the alternative hypothesis (H1) which says that
the critical parameters have significant impact on the
postprivatization performance of the IBEDC and
IKEDC is rejected. This means that privatization of
the power sector does not improve performance of
both DISCOs judging by the parameters or variables
of Responsiveness to customers, load shedding, supply,
pricing, metering, and coverage.
Discussion of findings
Having carried out the descriptive and inferential statis-
tical analysis via regression test, the research at this point
reviews the implications of the findings for the DISCOs,
customers and the country. The findings revealed that
there is low performance of both DISCOs judging by the
critical success factors outputs from the earlier series of
analysis in section 5.0. This implies that IBEDC and
IKEDC, as private firms operating in a liberalized market,
have underperformed in providing services to the
Table 4. Regression analysis between critical parameters mea-
sures and performance outcomes.
Model summary
Model R R square Adjusted R square Std. error of the estimate
1 .456a .208 .202 .391012
aPredictors: (Constant), Customers_Responsiveness, Load_Shedding,
Electricity_Supply, Pricing_Billing, Metering, Coverage
Dependent: Performance Outcome
Source: Field Survey (2018)
Table 5. Analysis of variance (ANOVA).
ANOVA
Model Sum of squares Df Mean square F Sig.
1 Regression 29.168 6 4.861 31.797 .000b
Residual 110.845 725 .153
Total 140.014 731
bPredictors: (Constant), Customers_Responsiveness, Load_Shedding,
Electricity_Supply, Pricing_Billing, Metering, Coverage
Source: Field Survey (2018)
Table 6. Coefficients.
Coefficients
Unstandardized
coefficients
Standardized
coefficients
Model B
Std.
error Beta T Sig.
1 (Constant) 2.425 .098 24.702 .000
Electricity_Supply .256 .073 .400 11.241 .000
Pricing_Billing −.129 .061 .149 2.395 .003
Coverage .121 .075 .132 2.857 .002
Metering .177 .060 .138 3.875 .000
Load_Shedding .186 .061 .237 4.139 .000
Responsiveness to
Customer
.124 .071 .143 2.153 .009
Dependent Variable: performance outcome
Source: Field Survey (2018)
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residential and commercial customers especially, on elec-
tricity supply, pricing/billing, and metering with great
implications for businesses’ thriving, that is suggesting
that poor power supply would make commercial custo-
mers seek alternative sources (independent power gen-
erator) thereby incurring additional cost of operation
with a dire effect on profit margin.
Also, the finding suggests that citizens’ welfare pro-
motion through stable power supply to enhance quality
of living is undermined and the country’s socio-
economic development is generally threatened. As
such, the privatization theory argument of inherent
performance capacity of private sector efficiency, pro-
ductivity and efficient service by Muogbo (2013) is
contrasted and this corresponds with the submission
of Aluko (n.d.) that inflated contract, patronage and
corruption are the sources of private firms profit in
Nigeria and not inherent efficiency. Likewise, while
the research finding strongly counterpoint the findings
of Hashim (2017), Nepal and Foster (2016) Soukana
and Anal (2015), it corroborates, to some extent, Pincus
(2014) outcome on Cameroon, especially in the quality
of service or electricity supply, pricing and overall
impact on the economic growth. One can infer that
close corresponding outcome of postprivatization per-
formance of both Nigeria and Cameroon, as revealed in
this research and the work of Pincus (2014) respec-
tively, suggest that privatization of the power sector
has a fundamental error or poor contextual issue(s) in
its application and demands a revision for appropriate
implementation in both countries and, perhaps, other
African countries that share similar experience.
Conclusion and recommendations
This study examined IBEDC and IKEDC postprivatiza-
tion performance using critical success indicators of
electricity supply, load shedding, pricing metering
response to customers, and coverage area. The findings
revealed that IBEDC and IKEDC underperformed as
a private firms aimed to transform the electricity power
sector by bringing their technical, management and
financial capacities to bear towards ensuring quality
service delivery to costumers.
Arising from the above findings with its implications
and conclusion, the study recommends that IBEDC and
IKEDC should inject fund for the replacement or
upgrade of dilapidated power equipments, provision
of meters, especially, pre-paid type while government
make the business environment convenient for healthy
competition and regulation. Similarly, DISCOs should
explore capital market opportunities for funding and
improvement of service to customers.
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